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1Abstract
We consider repeated two-person, zero-sum games in which the
preferences in the repeated game depend on the stage-game prefer-
ences, although not necessarily in a time-consistent way. We assume
that each player’s repeated game payoﬀ function at each period of time
is strictly increasing on the stage game payoﬀs and that the repeated
game is itself a zero-sum game in every period. Under these assump-
tions, we show that an outcome is a subgame perfect outcome if and
only if all its components are Nash equilibria of the stage game.
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21 Introduction
When faced with a dynamic decision problem, individuals often display a
desire to commit themselves to a particular plan of future actions. At ﬁrst
sight, a commitment to a plan of future actions may seem puzzling, since
by doing so any individual is reducing the alternatives he will have in the
future. However, commitment to a future plan of actions may be part of
the optimal way to choose today when individuals’ preferences change over
time, i.e, when individual have time-inconsistent preferences.
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in time-inconsistent pref-
erences, and its consequences for economic theory, and policy. Much of
this interest was motivated by the fact that time-inconsistent preferences
can change a model’s implications for economic policy, as shown by Laib-
son [5], Jovanovic and Stolyarov [3], and Kocherlakota [4]. Is is the case
that time-inconsistent preferences will always change a model’s implications
for economic policy? We show that in a two-person, zero-sum game time-
inconsistent preferences have no eﬀect over the equilibrium outcomes that
can arise, and so have no eﬀect over the model’s implication for economic
policy.
Our main result can be stated as follows: consider a repeated two-person,
zero-sum games in which the preferences in the repeated game depend on the
3stage-game preferences, although not necessarily in a time-consistent way.
Thus, players have a (possibly diﬀerent) payoﬀ function in every period.
Assume that each player’s repeated game payoﬀ function at each period of
time is strictly increasing on the stage game payoﬀs, and, if the repeated
game is itself a zero-sum game in every period (i.e., the sum of the player’s
period t payoﬀs in the repeated game equals zero, for all t.) Under these
assumptions, we will show that an outcome is a subgame perfect outcome if
and only if all its components are Nash equilibria of the stage game.
Two-person, zero-sum (normal form) games are regarded as descriptions
of highly competitive situations. This conﬁrmed by the fact that in Nash
equilibrium any player may assume that her opponent is choosing his action
to minimize her payoﬀ. Our result shows that this competitiveness still holds
when the game is repeated countably many times.
It should be noted that the conclusion of our main result belongs to the
oral tradition of game theory, at least when the repeated game payoﬀs are
given by the discounted sum of stage game payoﬀs. A contribution of our
work is to provide a simple proof of that result, and to show that it holds
under quite general assumptions.
Given the recent interest on the economic eﬀects of time-inconsistent
preferences, it is interesting to know what game-theoretic results change by
4assuming time-inconsistent preferences. This question seems natural to us
since, as Peleg and Yaari [6] and Goldman [2] pointed out, the appropriate
way of modelling time-inconsistency in preferences is through the concept
of subgame perfect equilibrium of a game between an agent and his future
selves.1 We see our work as a contribution towards answering this general
question.
2 Notation and deﬁnitions
A two-person, zero-sum game G is deﬁned by
G = (A1;A2;u1;u2);
where for all i = 1;2: (1) Ai is a ﬁnite set of player i’ actions, and (2)
ui : A ! R; where A = A1 £ A2; is player i’ payoﬀ function; the player’s
payoﬀ functions satisfy
u1(a) + u2(a) = 0;
for all a 2 A. Let Si = ∆(Ai); S = S1 £ S2, and ui : S ! R be the usual
extension to mixed strategies.
Let, for i = 1;2, vi = mins¡i maxsi ui(si;s¡i), and NE = fs 2 S :
for all i = 1;2;ui(s) ¸ ui(˜ si;s¡i); for all ˜ si 2 Sig. The set NE is the set of
1The concept of time-inconsistent preferences was itself introduced by Strotz [7].
5Nash equilibria of G, and vi is the minmax level for player i.
The supergame of G consists of an inﬁnite sequence of repetitions of G
taking place in periods t = 1;2;3;:::: At period t the players make simulta-
neous moves denoted by st
i 2 Si and then each player learn his opponent’s
move.
For k ¸ 1, a k¡stage history is a k¡length sequence hk = (s1;:::;sk);
where, for all 1 · t · k; st 2 S; the space of all k¡stage histories is
Hk, i.e., Hk = Sk (the k¡fold Cartesian product of S.)2 The notation
e stands for the unique 0–stage history — it is a 0–length history that




For every h 2 H, deﬁne hr 2 S to be the projection of h onto its rth
coordinate. For every h 2 H we let `(h) denote the length of h. For two
positive length histories h and ¯ h in H we deﬁne the concatenation of h
and ¯ h, in that order, to be the history (h ¢ ¯ h) of length `(h) + `(¯ h): (h ¢
¯ h) = (h1;h2;:::;h`(h);¯ h1;¯ h2;:::;¯ h`(¯ h)): We also make the convention that
e ¢ h = h ¢ e = h for every h 2 H.
It is assumed that at stage k each player knows hk; that is each player
2As in Aumann [1], we are assuming that players can observe the mixed strategies cho-
sen. This assumption is not crucial to our work since, as Theorem 1 will show, equilibrium
play is independent of the history.
6knows the actions that were played in all previous stages. Regarding strate-
gies, players chose behavioral strategies, that is, in each stage k, they choose
a function from Hk¡1 to Si denoted fi
k; for player i = 1;2. The set of player
i’s strategies is denoted by Fi, and F = F1 £ F2 is the joint strategy space.








Given an individual strategy fi 2 Σi and a history h 2 H we denote
the individual strategy induced by fi at h by fijh. This strategy is deﬁned
pointwise on H: (fijh)(¯ h) = fi(h ¢ ¯ h), for every ¯ h 2 H. We will use (fjh) to
denote (f1jh;:::;fnjh) for every f 2 S and h 2 H.
Any strategy f 2 F induces an outcome ¼(f) as follows:
¼1(f) = f(e); ¼k(f) = f(¼1(f);:::;¼k¡1(f)); (1)
for k 2 N. Thus, we have deﬁne a function ¼ : F ! S1, where S1 =
S £ S £ ¢¢¢.
Let M ¸ 0 be such that jui(s)j · M, for all s 2 S, and i 2 N. Then,
any outcome ¼ 2 S1 induces two elements in l1, one for each player, as
follows
xk
i (¼) = ui(¼k); (2)
for all k 2 N. Thus, we have deﬁne a function xi : S1 ! l1, for all i = 1;2.
For x;y 2 l1, x = y, means xk ¸ yk, for all k 2 N; x ¸ y means x 6= y
and x = y.
7Let for each i = 1;2, and k 2 N, Uk
i : l1 ! R be given. The payoﬀ for
player i, i = 1;2, from his point of view in period k 2 N of a strategy f 2 F
in the supergame of G is deﬁned to be Uk
i (xi ± ¼(f)).
A strategy vector f 2 F is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the su-
pergame of G if Uk
i (xi(h¢¼(fjh))) ¸ Uk
i (xi(h¢¼(gi;f¡ijh))), for all i = 1;2,
k 2 N, h 2 Hk¡1 and gi 2 Fi. Let EΠ denote the set of subgame perfect
equilibrium outcomes.
3 Equilibrium outcomes
In this section we state and prove our main result.
Theorem 1 Suppose that for all k 2 N, and i = 1;2,
1. Uk
1(x1(¼)) + Uk
2(x2(¼)) = 0, for all ¼ 2 S1,
2. Uk
i is strictly increasing: x;y 2 l1 and x ¸ y implies Uk
i (x) > Uk
i (y).
Then, EΠ = NE1 and ui(¼k) = vi for all ¼ 2 EΠ, i = 1;2, and k 2 N.
Proof. Clearly, we have that NE1 µ EΠ, and so it is enough to show
that EΠ µ NE1.
8Let ¼ 2 EΠ, i = 1;2, and k 2 N. By 2,
Uk










i (¼);vi;vi;:::) := ¯ vk
i :
(3)
Let ® be a Nash equilibrium of G; thus, in particular, ui(®) = vi.
By letting ˜ ¼ = (¼1;:::;¼k¡1;®;®;:::); we conclude by 1 that ¯ vk
1 + ¯ vk
2 =
Uk
1(x1(˜ ¼)) + Uk
2(x2(˜ ¼)) = 0: Also, by 1, Uk
1(x1(¼)) + Uk
2(x2(¼)) = 0: Hence,
Uk(xi) = ¯ vk
i :











and so by 2, maxsi ui(si;¼k
¡i) = vi.
Since ui(¼k) = xk
i (¼) · maxsi ui(si;¼k
¡i) = vi, for all k 2 N, and
U1
i (xi(¼)) ¸ U1
i (vi;vi;:::), it follows that




hence, ¼k is a Nash equilibrium.
A interesting particular case is when both player use the same function
to evaluate repeated game payoﬀs. In this case, then it is enough that
this common function be additive, and strictly increasing in order for the
conclusion of Theorem 1 to hold. A particular case of an additive function is
9a continuous linear functional, but we note that our result hold for functions
outside this class.
Corollary 1 Suppose that for all k 2 N
1. Uk
i = Uk, for i = 1;2,
2. Uk is additive: Uk(x + y) = Uk(x) + Uk(y), for all x;y 2 l1,
3. Uk is strictly increasing: x;y 2 l1 and x ¸ y implies Uk(x) > Uk(y).
Then, EΠ = NE1 and ui(¼k) = vi for all ¼ 2 EΠ, i 2 N, and k 2 N.
The following example shows that we cannot dispense with additivity in
the case when both players use the same function to evaluate repeated game




Table 1: Payoﬀ Function for the Matching Pennies
Assume time-consistency, and let w = (¡1;1;¡1;1;:::).
10The preferences are, for ± 2 (0;1) and M > 0,
U(x) =
8
> > > <










This preferences are strictly increasing because = is transitive and the
discounted sum is strictly increasing. Deﬁne ¼ as follows ¼1 = (H;H),






i if h = (¼1;:::;¼k¡1)
play H with 1/2 probability otherwise:
(7)
Then f is a subgame perfect equilibrium and ¼ is a SPE outcome (and it
doesn’t consist of Nash equilibria of the stage game). This is so because the
payoﬀ of the equilibrium path is M ¡
(1¡±)2
1¡±2 , and the payoﬀ from deviating
is 1. By choosing M big enough, we can deter deviations.
However, we can weaken to requirement of additivity by adding some
extra conditions. One extra condition we need is independence from the
past: Let for h 2 H and r 2 N, ¸rh := (h1;:::;hr) and ¹rh := (hr;hr+1;:::):
We say that Uk, k 2 N, is independence of the past if for all x;y 2 S1
satisfying ¸k¡1x = ¸k¡1y then Uk(x) ¸ Uk(y) if and only if Uk(¹kx) ¸
Uk(¹ky). If, for all k 2 N, Uk is independent of the past, then f 2 F
is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if Uk(xi ± ¼(fjh)) ¸ Uk(xi ±
¼(gi;f¡ijh)), for all i = 1;2, k 2 N, h 2 Hk¡1 and gi 2 Fi.
11We can now state:
Theorem 2 Suppose that for all k 2 N
1. Uk
i = Uk, for i = 1;2,
2. Uk is independent of the past,
3. Uk(x + y) ¸ Uk(x) + Uk(y), for all x;y 2 l1,
4. Uk(®;®;:::) = ®, for all ® 2 R,
5. Uk is strictly increasing: x;y 2 l1 and x ¸ y implies Uk(x) > Uk(y).
Then, EΠ = NE1 and ui(¼k) = vi for all ¼ 2 EΠ, i = 1;2, and k 2 N.
Proof. Clearly, we have that NE1 µ EΠ, and so it is enough to show
that EΠ µ NE1.
Let ¼ 2 EΠ, i = 1;2, and k 2 N. For t ¸ k, let xt
i = ui(¼t), and
xi = (xk
i ;xk+1




¡i);vi;vi :::) ¸ Uk(vi;vi;:::) = vi: (8)
By 3, and 4,
Uk(x1) + Uk(x2) · Uk(x1 + x2) = 0: (9)
Because v1 + v2 = 0, it follows that
Uk(xi) = vi: (10)
12Thus, by 5, maxsi ui(si;¼k
¡i) = vi. Since ui(¼k) = xk
i · maxsi ui(si;¼k
¡i) =
vi, then ui(¼k) = vi. Since this equality holds for all k 2 N, it follows that
xi = (vi;vi;:::), and so by 5,




hence, ¼k is a Nash equilibrium.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that, under general conditions, equilibrium outcomes of re-
peated two-person, zero-sum games have the property that in every period a
Nash equilibrium of the stage game is played. This result is interesting for at
least two reasons: First, it shows that the strict competitiveness embodied in
two-person, zero-sum (normal-form) games extends to the repeated version.
Second, it shows that this is true, even if players have time-inconsistent
preferences; in particular, in economic situations described by a repeated
two-person, zero-sum game, the introduction of time-inconsistent prefer-
ences will not change the equilibrium outcomes that can arise, and so have
no eﬀect over the model’s implication for economic policy.
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